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 During the last few decades, historians and philosophers of science radically 
changed our perspective on logical empiricism in general, and on the Vienna Circle 
in particular. Though there are still some members of the Circle who did not get 
much attention (Victor Kraft, Richard von Mises, Felix Kaufmann, Josef Schächter 
etc.), we are in a quite good position to judge many of their efforts. On the other 
hand, our historical understanding of logical empiricism in general leaves some-
thing to be desired due to the circumstances that the so-called “Berlin Group” is 
underestimated in the literature. 
 The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism, edited by Nikolay 
Milkov and Volker Peckhaus, is meant to bring attention to the German wing of 
logical empiricism, thus doing justice to that forgotten projects and figures who 
had (in)directly an important influence on the philosophy of science in the United 
States after World War II. Among the most important members, one finds Hans 
Reichenbach, Kurt Grelling, Walter Dubislav, Paul Oppenheim, Olaf Helmer, Kurt 
Lewin, and Carl Gustav Hempel. The collection is devoted to their ideas and con-
text in the European philosophy of science scene. 
 Part 1 is an introductory chapter composed of two papers: a longer article by 
Nikolay Milkov about the ‘affinities and divergences’ between the Vienna Circle 
and the Berlin Group. Though Milkov provides many important details and no-
tions, his explanations are lacking sometimes, but I will come back to that later. 
The second paper is Nicholas Rescher’s personal memories about his “interactions 
and collaborations with members of the Berlin Group” (p. 33). Rescher focuses on 
Helmer, Hempel, and Oppenheim (usually called as the ‘H2O philosophers’), dis-
cussing their role in the RAND corporation, and while it is always illuminating to 
read personal recollections about the less known sides of history, his paper is just 
five pages long, so one can get only a slight hint about the historical events. 
 The second part of the collection aims to explore the historical and philosoph-
ical context of the Berlin Group. Helmut Pulte describes in a lucid fashion those 
nineteenth-century roots of the Group which goes back to Jakob Friedrich Fries, an 
important critic of Kant. The ideas of Fries were continued by E. F. Apelt (referred 
to by Reichenbach in his dissertation) and later by Leonard Nelson who founded 
the so-called New Friesian School, inspiring such scholars as Grelling (who pub-
lished with Nelson), Dubislav and Reichenbach. The second paper of this section 
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Jeremy Heis’ work on the connections between Ernst Cassirer, Lewin, and Reich-
enbach—a topic which surfaces again in Milkov’s paper who will argue that 
Hempel “more closely followed Lewin’s Cassirer-inspired project than he did that 
of Hans Reichenbach” (p. 298). 
 Given that the Berlin Group is associated with individual figures rather than 
commonly shared theses, the collection treats the main figures in separate chapters. 
Part 3 considers Reichenbach’s life and work. Flavia Padovani touches upon Reich-
enbach’s time in the so-called Jugendbewegung (German Youth Movement), the 
famous Erlangen-conference, and his work on the radio. The paper, otherwise, is 
devoted to the conceptions of time and ‘genidentity’ as it was worked out by Lewin 
and Reichenbach. Michael Stöltzner’s paper discusses the question of quantum me-
chanics and indeterminism. He achieves some important and strange conclusions; 
both Reichenbach and (based on his claims) the literature stated that the distin-
guishing feature of the Berlin Group (contrasting it with the Vienna Circle) is their 
member’s continuous contact with the actual works of scientists. Nonetheless, 
Stöltzner shows that this idea requires some qualification since Reichenbach “did 
not involve himself into the details of the physical discussions, but pursued a gen-
uinely philosophical agenda” (p. 146). Finally, Andreas Kamlah presents Reichen-
bach’s involvement in the Jugendbewegung, which was a reform movement, orig-
inated from the early years of the twentieth century. He was an important figure in 
the so-called Freistudenten [Free Students] movement in Berlin—due to its explicit 
socialist leanings Reichenbach had different times later in pursuing academic jobs. 
Kamlah argues quite convincingly that Reichenbach’s involvement (and leading 
role) in the voluntarist, pluralist, and tolerant movement had an important effect 
also on his philosophy (as it was the case actually with Carnap too). 
 Part 4 is devoted entirely to Dubislav—we got to know his logical works 
(Christian Thiel), his ideas on transcendental arguments (Temilo van Zantwijk), 
and his relation to Bernard Bolzano (Anita Kasabova). Two things emerge from 
these articles: Dubislav was involved in many up-to-date projects, acknowledged 
by many important figures of the history of logic and philosophy in the twentieth 
century. The other is that the fact that Dubislav is quite forgotten among philoso-
phers might be due to the fact that, for example, his logical project was partly a 
failure since his work did not provide a decision procedure for classical monadic 
quantificational logic, or more precisely, “it yields only a sufficient criterion of 
validity, and not a necessary one” (p. 187). 
 Kurt Grelling (discussed in Part 5), though played in important role in the Ber-
lin Group, he was always a third member behind Reichenbach and Dubislav as it 
is argued in Volker Peckhaus’ contribution. Peckhaus mentions Grelling’s ideas on 
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formal ontology (which is also the subject of Arkadiusz Chrudzimski’s paper), his 
Russellian leanings (he translated four important books of Russell), and his in-
volvement in psychology. Nevertheless, what emerges in these sections for sure is 
that Grelling was “a valuable collaborator” (p. 241). 
 The final, sixth part of the collection contains one paper on Oppenheim (Paul 
Ziche with Thomas Müller), and two on Hempel (Nikolay Milkov and Erich H. 
Reck). Ziche and Müller take Oppenheim as a co-author of many important phi-
losophers of science and claims that he was “the greatest philosophical co-author 
of the twentieth century” (p. 265). On the other hand, and more importantly, they 
also view Oppenheim as an individual scholar who was interested in the order of 
the sciences, holding some unique position among logical empiricists. The 
Hempel-papers consider him in relation to others: Milkov argues against Michael 
Friedman’s thesis that Hempel was influenced more by Carnap than by any Ber-
liner. Finally, Reck takes the late Carnap’s ideal of explication (on which we have 
now a flourishing secondary literature, partly due to Reck), and compares it to 
Hempel’s ideas on the Covering Law Model of explanation; on the base of this 
Reck is able “to get clearer about why exactly [Hempel’s] texts were so influential 
and, more basically, what their philosophical significance is” (p. 312). 
 Finally, a few words need to be said about the general narrative of the volume. 
In his introduction, Milkov claims that there is a certain asymmetry in the reception 
of the Berlin Group and the Vienna Circle in favor of the latter, though in some 
cases the Berliners have a priority claim. After that, he tries to show the reasons of 
the general neglect of Reichenbach’s group. He discusses one theoretical and three 
external factors which purported to explain the asymmetry in the reception-history. 
The theoretical factor is that what “made the Vienna Circle’s activities the more 
visible was Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language” (p. 5), and that when 
the philosophical debates of the Circle got public it “called attention to themselves 
in ways not seen in the Berlin Group” (p. 5). Contrary to this, the Berlin Group was 
occupied with dialogues of working scientist, keeping their eyes on the concrete 
scientific developments instead of inner-type philosophical debates. 
 The problem is that which Vienna Circle does Milkov talk about? The Vienna 
Circle members indeed shared many commitments, mainly connected to Wittgen-
stein, and debated only about philosophical matters (external to the actual scientific 
problems) according to the received view. Thanks to such volumes as Milkov’s and 
Peckhaus’, however, we are now aware of that fact that the received view was false—
or at least misleading and oversimplified. So Milkov’s story could be true in the re-
ceived view, but false in the rehabilitated picture—the question is, which story was 
the story about the Circle in the 1920s and 1930s. Anyway, another question 
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emerges—namely that how did actual scientists respond to the claims and theories of 
the Berlin Group? Were they taken seriously? We do not get an answer to that. 
 The external factors behind the asymmetry are these: (i) the manifesto’s radical 
program made the Circle recognized worldwide, (ii) the members of the Berlin 
Group had quite a peculiar and tragic careers without becoming as mainstream and 
known scholars as Schlick or Neurath, (iii) “[w]hereas Hitler came to power in 
Berlin in January 1933, he did not force Austria into the German Reich for more 
than 5 years (in March 1938)” (p. 7). 
 Regarding (i) one might point out that (a) the manifesto raised important and 
deep controversies inside the Circle; (b) the papers of Eino Kaila, Åke Petzäll and 
Feigl/Bloomberg did not originate from the Circle’s manifesto—Kaila went to the 
Circle’s meetings in 1929 but knew their program much earlier, and Feigl was one 
of those students of Schlick who persuaded him to gather a group of scholars 
around him to discuss philosophical problems. On the other hand, Reichenbach 
already published many important books and papers (also popular ones) already in 
the early 1920s. It is a further question (perhaps connected to the Austrian and 
German philosophical scene) why his efforts were less successful in the forming 
periods. 
 The second point is also problematic: it is true that it was only Reichenbach 
who “fully developed his philosophical program” (p. 6)—while Grelling orga-
nized some discussion groups even in the internment camp in South (Vichy) 
France in 1941, he died in Auschwitz one year later, still in his productive years. 
Dubislav, after a short imprisonment in Berlin, went to Prague where “he killed 
in jealousy first his girl-friend then himself on 16 September 1937” (p. 237). 
Many of the members of the Vienna Circle indeed had a much fruitful and longer 
career. On the other hand, Hahn died already in 1934, and Schlick was murdered 
in 1936; Zilsel committed suicide in 1944. While all the members of the Berlin 
Group worked in Berlin between 1926 and 1933 (when Reichenbach immigrated 
to Turkey), the Vienna Circle’s most important members left Vienna quite early: 
Philipp Frank took over Einstein’s position in Prague in 1912, Carnap got a po-
sitions there too in 1931, and after 1934 Neurath went to Hague. Somehow the 
Circle still managed to work together and built up the narrative of a successful 
discussion group. 
 Finally, though Hitler came to power in Berlin in 1933, the national socialist’s 
revolution in Vienna caused the dissolution of the Ernst Mach Society already in 
1934 and made it impossible (even earlier) for many members to get a job at the 
University.  
 Though Milkov did a great job to explore the reasons behind the asymmetry 
between Berlin and Vienna, some more details and inquiries are required since in 
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themselves the above-mentioned reasons are insufficient to explain the historical 
phenomena. Even if the book could be considered to be only a starting point for 
the later philosophical debates, The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical 
Empiricism is an important collection of fine-grained and thought-provoking es-
says; they show some possible paths from Vienna to Berlin and back.1 
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